No End in Sight, a documentary by Charles Ferguson analyzing the United States involvement in Iraq, was released to very little fanfare this past week. The only theatre in town screening the film was the Bloor Cinema on a Friday night.
Ferguson sought to encompass the perspectives of the American decision-makers, tying them to the events that covered the first critical year of the Iraqi occupation in 2003. In many ways, U.S. choices made regarding the Iraq War paralleled British decisions in the Crimean War. In explaining how the entire war has been comprised of one fiasco following another, No End in Sight illustrates several salient lessons regarding leadership.
Lack of Knowledge: those who were making decisions neither understood the political situation in Iraq nor possessed combat or occupation experience. Few members of the Coalition Provisional Authority spoke Arabic, straining communications with Iraqi citizens. The De-Ba’athification policy deprived Iraq of most of those with education who had been working in the country’s administration.
Failure to Adjust: when one plan went array, there was no impetus to make alternate arrangements or modify expectations. Frequently, those who reported that something didn’t work out as planned were fired. Prejudices guided decisions, such as expensive contracts awarded to U.S. based companies when local groups were completing the same projects using less resources.
Communication: decisions were made in Washington and from behind the walls of the Green Zone, reflecting a disconnection between allied troops and their commanders. Many in the U.S. Armed Forces resented the decision-makers due to their lack of experience and the belief that they were not entirely truthful.
Poor Planning: the U.S. government did not devote enough time to planning the post-war occupation. Key information was ignored and not considered when creating the blueprints of the post-Saddam Iraq. The Armed Forces sent roughly half the number of troops required; consequently looting abounded, key structures – ranging from the National Museum to government buildings – were demolished, and ceaseless violence turned most Iraqi citizens against their occupiers.
Shake Hands with the Devil, the film adaptation of General Roméo Dallaire’s book describes how international leadership breakdowns led to the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s. In contrast to No End, this film is based on a single point of view. Whilst the film demonstrates how numerous soldiers were affected by the atrocities, the main theme is one man’s struggles to balance his job with his values, trying to do whatever he can to save lives despite operational constraints imposed by his superiors.
The single perspective of Roméo Dallaire is the film’s strong point and weak link. Roy Dupuis appears in nearly every scene and the audience connects sympathizes with him. However, Dupuis’ performance is at times wooden. Questions arise as to whether the film is entirely accurate, especially with regards to accusations of French complicity in the affair.
The film is very disjointed, jumping from one incident to another. On one hand, it suits the chaotic nature of the hundred days of the genocide. On the other, it prevents deeper investigation of specific incidents.
Scenes in a therapist’s office symbolize the regret Dallaire feels because he was forced to ignore evidence proving that militants were acquiring weapons. Furthermore, the Rwandan Prime Minister was assassinated under the “protection” of United Nations peacekeepers unable to fire on her attackers.
Leading by Example: The protagonist models the way for the troops under his command. A lynchpin of Dallaire’s leadership is his devotion to those who serve with him and those whom he feels responsible to protect. He is also creative, devising outside the box, such as “exchanges” of non-combatants, to solve crucial problems.
Resources: It seems that the U.N. mission is crippled by a lack of resources, from troops to ammunition. The international community spends so much time arguing over terminology that Dallaire cannot even conduct basic operations in attempt to prevent the genocide. Like Iraq, the ultimate decision-makers handcuff the troops on the ground with their inaction.
Those who Forget History…: Like the Middle East, Rwanda was a country were the ethnic divisions – between Hutus and Tutsis – were created and heightened by European powers, in this case Belgian colonials.
Both situations in Iraq and Rwanda reach a degree of absurdity, characterized by a scene in Shake Hands were Dallaire is kicking a can in an open area, amid threats of sniper fire. An armed militia member appears, asking the U.N. forces present if they members of “Dallaire’s Gang”, announcing that he will kill the general if he sees him. Dallaire introduces himself and the two shake hands. The militia member walks off, unsure of what to do next.
Some of the events across the globe, from Yugoslavia to Darfur to Somalia to Iraq to Rwanda are so violent that the indifference of international observers is best described by absurdist metaphors. General Dallaire and other soldiers are so deeply influenced by what they witnessed that they can’t leave it behind, inching forward, one day at a time.