Scoring and the Shot Clock

In Coaching by Brock Bourgase

A recent study by University of Minnesota physics professor Brian Skinner suggesting the it is better for N.B.A. players to shoot early in the shot clock. Skinner mentions that shots taken within first eight seconds of the shot clock generate 1.05 points each shot whereas those taken in the final two seconds of the clock produce 0.85 points. The expected point value of each shot declines very slightly from the beginning of the possession until the final eight seconds when shots become progressively worse. 911 shots as the clock winds down provide the lowest expected value.

According to Skinner’s statistics, N.B.A. players take more shots later in the possession The author believe that players erroneously pass up a moderately successful shot early in the clock because they believe a better one will manifest itself. Skinner feels that players may hold the ball because they underestimate the chance for a turnover and because teams design their offenses to execute shots later in the possession.

Looking at the study at face value and stating that players should shoot early is misleading. Offensive basketball does not consistent of twenty-four seconds under uniform conditions. Possessions are divided into five components that are significantly different in terms of offensive and defensive tactics. A team gains possession in the own end and proceeds down the court in transition with a numerical superiority. As all players come down the court, the defenders match up and the halfcourt play begins. When the shot clock counts down, teams run plays designed to produce a quick shot.

The primary break which follows a turnover or long rebound usually results in a very high-percentage shot. The secondary break after a quick rebound and outlet also frequently leads to an open shot. The early offense, before the defence has completely set up, can also create a good shot, as shown by Skinner’s numbers. N.B.A. teams take about forty percent of their shots in these first ten seconds of the shot clock.

Teams shoot about fifteen percent of their shots in the last four seconds of the shot clock, showing that offenses do not rely on the shot late in the possession. Many successful teams shot early in the shot clock (not because of a seven seconds or left doctrine but because that’s when it is easiest to score). Good teams have defenses that force turnovers or outside shots that enable frequent high percentage transition chances.

Against good teams, it becomes very hard to take good shots. The best teams will pressure the ball consistently and force the opponent to take low percentage shots. Teams that succeed in the playoffs possess the ability to get high percentage shots against top defenses. Teams that play at a higher pace win inconsistently; pace factor does not always correlate with high effective field goal percentage because teams may have severe difficulty scoring when it is not in transition. Teams that win the points in the paint battles win sixty percent of games; the bigger the margin, the higher the winning percentage.

Teams that maximize their transition chances and limit the ability of the opponents to attack before the defense is set will have an advantage. In the age of thorough video analysis, teams will take away the first and second options from the opponent so if a team can score before the defense can match-up and force the offense to adapt, they are better off. Some poor teams show an enormous drop in effective field goal percentage after the offense starts because they are not skilled enough to score when someone is guarding them. Perhaps they cannot beat their man off the dribble, turn the ball over or lack the ability to run a system that makes everyone on the team a threat to score. Creative teams that evolve as the game progresses and share the ball among all team members display field goal percentage curves that are more consistent.

Coaches can use the information in the article in the following ways:

  • Get back in defensive transition so the primary and secondary break become a halfcourt possession as soon as possible.
  • Pressure the ball to produce turnovers, reduce ball penetration and force outside shots.
  • Find the best scoring threat in transition and make a good pass to get them the ball.
  • Choose not to settle; if the defense is not entirely ready, cutters can flash to the ball and create a high percentage scoring chance.
  • Make all five players part of the halfcourt offense so the defense must spread the court and leave room for lanes to the basket and open shots.
  • Practice an efficiency offense that quickly provides quality shots.
  • Eschew predictability on offense and defense; adapt throughout the game and make the opponent adjust.

As York coach Tom Oliveri mentioned his reply to his study, “The Boston Celtics played some of the best basketball we’ve seen in a long time by sharing the basketball and making the extra pass.” Making the extra pass to someone who is in the paint or in an open shooting position is the complete opposite of running a low shot clock offense that treats the ball like a hot potato. The best teams are those who get the ball to the best scoring option during critical possessions as consistently as they do early in the games.

Taking the early shot because it’s better than what might materialize later is like saying never pass into the high post because the expected point value of a shot in that area is below average relative to other locations on the court. However, making that pass could lead to a low post entry, a pass to a cutter for a high percentage shot or an open shot in the corner, areas with high expected values. Relative to Skinner’s study, holding the ball is worthwhile if it means pulling the ball out in transition instead of committing an offensive foul or dribbling inside with the goal of finding an open shooter. Holding the ball without any ball or player movement will not improve the expected point value and illustrates the study’s argument.

Oliveri discussed how the Phoenix Suns never won a championship. The 2004-10 Phoenix teams always succeeded to a point, usually until the conference semi-finals or conference finals stage. What worked against the average team (:07 Seconds or Less), never worked against top teams. Over the course of a season, when it is equally likely to play a good team or a bad team, shooting early works. Once a good team set up their defense and began to protect the paint, the Suns became less effective. During the regular season, Phoenix could hide their below average defensive efficiency because their offensive efficiency early in the shot clock was so good.

Arguing the point using outliers as examples can shed some light but examining what happens most consistently. In short, the teams that win are the teams that understand what is a good shot for them and take that shot as soon as they see it. These days do not care who takes the short. More importantly, the teams that win are those who force their opponents to take bad shots. As the shot clock winds down, these teams take all of the good shots away. Good teams also avoid turnovers, eliminating an opponent scoring chance and producing a transition chance of their own, and get to the line, raising their effective field goal percentages.