The Revenge of Don Nelson

In N.B.A. Basketball by Brock Bourgase

The Association Playoffs have provided a number of interesting moments regarding how decision-making, self-actualization, creativity, and aggressiveness come to the surface on the basketball court and in life.

First of all, ESPN Page 2 is entirely correct to congratulate “the Golden State Warriors for making us watch the N.B.A. again.” The Warriors – led by Baron Davis and playing with a five-second shot clock – provided one of the few surprising moments in an Association that had been mundane and predictable for the past eight or nine years.

As Bill Simmons wrote, at least Golden State took chances. A number of the team’s acquisitions were plagued with injuries or off-court troubles but the players provided excellent skill, speed and athleticism, and experience. Don Nelson’s strategies defied conventional wisdom: the team chose to play with a small line-up at an aggressive tempo and multiple defensive alignments disrupted the opponent’s plans. John Hollinger commented that a key difference between Don Nelson and Sam Mitchell is Nelson’s willingness to trust veteran players and leave stars on the court despite foul trouble if the team needs them.

General Manager Chris Mullin rolled the dice and hit the jackpot with his biggest move: re-hiring Don Nelson. Mullin had assembled a team that could play with energy and tenacity but needed someone to provided that extra bit of aggressiveness and confidence on the court. Despite the proximity to the basketball season, Mullin replaced Coach Mike Montgomery with Don Nelson in late August. Mullin knew it was the right move and felt he had to take initiative, even if the team was disrupted in the short-term.

Gambling is inherently risky — Golden State could have missed the playoffs, Stephen Jackson could have been incarcerated, Baron Davis could have injured his knee, and Don Nelson could have exploded. But they didn’t. By taking chances, the Warriors took control of their destiny and put the pressure on their opponents.

On the East Coast, the Toronto Raptors illustrated some truths about ball and life. Unlike the Golden State, they did not seize control of their series with New Jersey and there were a number of awful performances under pressure.

I think that the Raptors did not do a good job evaluating and focusing on their strengths. There was an opportunity to attack the Nets inside, with Chris Bosh’s drives from the high-post or the screen and roll game with Bosh and Andrea Bargnani. When Toronto trapped New Jersey’s ballscreens, it pressured the Nets and forced some bad decisions. On the whole, the Raptors made the series too easy for their opponents by not playing with enough aggressiveness and confidence.

This was clearly displayed on Toronto’s last two possessions of the game: a missed fade-away jumpshot and a stolen lob pass. The experienced player will drive to the basket and go to the line in crunch time: this is what Michael Jordan did over six championships and it’s what stars like Steve Nash, Kobe Bryant, and Tim Duncan do today. Chris Bosh’s made a poor decision to shoot a long jumpshot when he could have penetrated into the lane and gone to the line to increase Toronto’s lead.

Chris Bosh possesses a number of very good moves from the high post. His decisions to rely too much on a square-up jumper and the occasional Rocker Step are frustrating to watch because he is choosing to limit his game.

The last possession, which was stolen when Richard Jefferson dropped to collapse on Chris Bosh, was poorly constructed. Apparently, Jose Calderon felt that the pass was “six-inches” short from being successful. Perhaps, but the pass could have also been three or four feet closer to the basket with a different spin.

The play lacked dynamism: from a stationary position it was very difficult for Calderon to complete the lob pass to Bosh. Due to the pressure of the moment, most of the Toronto team was very static, as was customary during tense offensive possessions throughout the series. More dribble penetration and weak-side action would have provided addition distractions for New Jersey’s defence and given Calderon greater options as time wound down.