Bruce Bowen Drills Baseline Threes: So do Morris Peterson, Joe Johnson, and Donyell Marshall. Given how awkward Bowen is from the wing or the top of the key, he must shoot very well from corner in order to maintain his 38% overall three point percentage. In fact, the baseline three Bowen attempted in the last minute of Game 5 provided the Spurs with a higher expected point value (1.26) than had any of the other four players on the court attempted a two-point field goal (1.04).
Mike D’Antoni Occasionally Mismanages His Rotation: The Suns largely played six players, in light of the suspensions to Amare Stoudemire and Boris Diaw. Defensively, Phoenix conceded some open looks or fouled unnecessarily. Offensively, there were some atrocious possessions were Steve Nash dribbled endlessly into the defence while shooters and cutters stood still. At both ends of the court, it seems like fatigue contributed to questionable decisions.
The go-ahead three-pointer succeeded because San Antonio moved the ball away from the defence and Nash could not get to Bowen in time. I propose that if the Suns had played a deeper rotation, using Marcus Banks to spell the guards briefly and Jalen Rose to carry some of the scoring load, they would have had more energy for defence during the Spurs decisive run
The Suns Work Very Hard on Defence but their Execution Is Sometimes Lacking: Phoenix should have doubled the post entry to Tim Duncan and left Tony Parker open outside the arc, as they did. Parker was the best option out of a set of bad choices for the Suns: Manu Ginobli was en fuego, Michael Finley was draining shots from the line of 45º – when he passed on his shot, he was swinging it swiftly to Bowen in the corner – and Duncan and Parker were consistent as usual.
Why did Leandro Barbosa make such a looping turn after the ball left the double-team? The fastest guy on the court could only recover to Parker and box him out in the Russian Spot during the shot. Maybe he could have reached Bowen if he had more energy. How did James Jones, guarding Finley, get awkwardly tangled up in the strong-side with Barbosa? If Raja Bell and Nash had not played 47 and 46 minutes respectively, could they have run and jumped Parker’s penetration better? Could Nash have closed out Bowen effectively with fresher legs?
It will never be known whether the Suns too tired to close out correctly down the stretch or if they were unaware of where the San Antonio threats were positioned during the critical play.
It’s Important to Mentally Prepare for End-Game Situations: D’Antoni should have given more thought to the rotation after the initial double. It was highly probable that Parker would penetrate after receiving the pass. Had Bell plugged the foul line, Nash quickly stepped up to Ginobli, and Barbosa switched to Bowen, I think they could have prevented Parker from getting to the rim, Ginobli and Finley from shooting, and gotten to Bowen in time to change his shot, Barbosa’s physical limitations aside.
Many complicated issues would have arisen. Shawn Marion would have probably bared the onus of stopping Duncan one-on-one in a low shot clock situation. Duncan tough to stop on the block and may have gone to the line. All five Suns would have to box out. All things considered, I think that that scenario yields an expected point value of 1.02, although that figure is more art than science.